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  neuroimaging experiments that allow studying the neural basis, 
chronometry, mechanisms, and impact of each specific emotion 
in isolation.
Regret is typically defined as “a negative, cognitively determined 
emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our 
present situation would have been better, had we acted differently” 
(Bell, 1982). Disappointment (and its positive counterpart Elation) 
is formally defined by Bell (1985) as proportional to the mismatch 
(numerical difference) between the subject’s expectations and the 
actual outcome. Thus, to formally evaluate disappointment we 
need to quantify both the size of the outcome and the subject’s 
expectations or predictions. However, expectations are hardly ever 
controlled in typical gambling tasks as most studies focus on the 
size and valence of the monetary outcomes without accounting for 
the internal reference point (subject’s prediction or expectations). 
Expectations are, according to the formal definition of disappoint-
ment, as important for the magnitude of the elicited emotion as 
the pure size of the outcome per se. Additionally, to evaluate disap-
pointment in isolation from regret we could take into account that 
“If actions have been constrained by outside forces, the individual 
seizes on these external attributions and hence feels no dissonance, 
no regret, and no self-blame” (Roese and Summerville, 2005). Thus, 
while disappointment and regret are hard to decouple in gambling 
IntroductIon
Decision making (DM) under uncertainty is part of our everyday 
life and humans do not always make decisions as predicted by 
rational or utilitarian laws. Such deviations are often attributed 
to emotions with several psychological and economic decision 
studies showing that DM involves a composite emotional reac-
tion encompassing diverse emotions such as regret, disappoint-
ment, satisfaction, rejoicing, anger, self-blame, elation, each of 
them grasping some aspects of the emotional situation, either 
in an overlapping or in mutually independent way (Roese and 
Summerville, 2005; Zeelenberg et al., 2008). While economists 
have started to explicitly incorporate diverse emotions such as 
disappointment and regret (Bell, 1982, 1985; Mellers, 2001) as 
clearly differentiated terms into their DM models, few neuroim-
aging studies tried to dissociate them. Two recent fMRI studies 
(Coricelli et al., 2005) and (Chua et al., 2009) relied on gambling 
tasks to determine the neural substrates of disappointment/regret 
to conclude that these emotions apparently differ on their neural 
substrate in addition to their well known differences in terms 
of definition, origins, importance to DM and relative frequency 
of occurrence between the individuals (Schimmack and Diener, 
1997).  Consequently,  to  continue  enlightening  both  neuro-
science and economic models we need more carefully designed 
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of two neural systems which co-exist and even compete to drive 
decisions (Caldu and Dreher, 2007; Sanfey and Chang, 2008). While 
different attributes and names have been given to these two systems, 
most authors agree that one of these systems is responsible for 
fast, automatic, and reflexive behavior (e.g., lowering expectations) 
while the other is responsible for slow, reflective, and conscious 
processing (e.g., investing extra effort). We were therefore interested 
in studying how Investors modified decisions concerning trust and 
expectations in trials following disappointment and whether or 
not behavioral changes could be accounted for the intervention 
of different neural generators as revealed by differences in whole 
scalp EEG topography.
Literature on the electrophysiological signatures of reward sig-
nals is vast, complex, and comprises research from very different 
recording scales and imaging modalities. Indeed, disappointment 
(as formally defined by Bell) cannot be completely distinguishable 
from the phenomenon of RPE linked to the dopamine system. 
However, in the TG, the mismatch between the expected and the 
real outcome might have similar signature in the brain as a feedback 
error related potentials.
Neurophysiological  studies  on  dopaminergic  single  neuron 
describe mechanisms such as change in firing rate according to 
the expected presence or not of a reward (Schultz, 1998; Fiorillo 
et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Zaghloul et al., 2009). 
On the other side, electroencephalography studies have long ago 
described an event-related potential (ERP), the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN) that appears on fronto-central electrodes fol-
lowing feedback error and which supposedly reflects activations 
of the ventral striatum, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
medial prefrontal cortex – see for example Falkenstein et al. (2000) 
for a tutorial. Importantly, there are various interpretations of 
those “error” signals, and theories such as error detection, con-
flict detection, or reinforcement learning still fight against each 
other for the best explanation. Briefly, in the error detection the-
ory, the ERN (a component similar to the FRN but more specific 
to motor action errors) reflects the mismatch between required 
and executed responses. Indeed, it was first considered as belong-
ing to a group of mismatch-related signals such as the Mismatch 
Negativity (Naatanen et al., 1978; Falkenstein et al., 2000). In the 
conflict detection view, the ACC uses this signal to monitor action 
and exert cognitive control over the behavior (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Bateson et al., 2006). The reinforcement learning theory holds that 
FRN reflects the impact of negative prediction error signal on the 
ACC. This signal is conveyed by the midbrain dopamine system 
and generated as a RPE when outcomes are worse than expected 
(Holroyd et al., 2006). Again, ACC will modify performance as a 
function of this signal. Irrespective of the correct interpretation 
of the FRN signal we expected to observe this type of responses 
in  fronto-central  electrodes  when  confronting  the  subjects  to 
  disappointing outcomes.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants and exPerIMental desIgn
Thirty-two  healthy  young  volunteers  (mean  age  25  ±  3.8,  17 
females) were recruited by advertisements posted at different fac-
ulties of the University of Geneva. Four of the participants were left-
handed. They had no history of neurological problems. The whole 
tasks where choices are the sole responsibility of the participant, 
they can be better dissociated when outcomes can be attributed 
to outside forces.
Our first goal was to devise an experimental paradigm able to 
effectively elicit disappointment in humans in isolation from regret. 
We relied on Bell’s definition of disappointment as it provides a 
formal quantitative measure of this. We were additionally inter-
ested in a paradigm suitable for electrophysiological recordings 
in humans since disappointment (elation) is the emotional reflect 
of a negative (positive) reward prediction error (RPE). Invasive 
electrophysiological recordings in animals have revealed the exist-
ence of dopaminergic neurons that code reward value as it differs 
from prediction, fulfilling the basic requirement for a bidirectional 
prediction error signal postulated by learning theory (Schultz, 
2010) which is likely to be crucial for goal-directed behavior and 
DM (Schultz, 2002; Caplin and Dean, 2008), and which complies 
with Bell’s definition of disappointment. Importantly, dissociat-
ing disappointment from regret is essential to compare with the 
animal literature as regret is likely to involve high level cognitive 
processing, not necessarily available to animals but required for 
counterfactual thinking.
To achieve our goals we adapted a well-known socio-economic 
game, the Trust Game (TG), widely used to study cooperative 
behavior (Cesarini et al., 2008; Wischniewski et al., 2009). In a 
TG, an individual (the investor) decides how much money out 
of an initial endowment to send to another subject (the trustee). 
The sent amount is then multiplied by some factor, usually three, 
and the trustee decides how much of the money received to send 
back to the investor. In our variant of the game, the participants 
assumed the role of the investors and played several trials, every 
time against a different and completely unknown trustee. On the 
basis of experimental evidence collected during previous runs of 
the TG, we expected participants to invest a part of their endow-
ments and blame Trustees (external forces) who do not reciprocate 
as responsible for their disappointment. We collected on every trial 
the expectations (anticipation) of the investors to manipulate the 
amounts allegedly given back to them by the Trustees as to elicit 
numerically quantifiable emotional reactions ranging from elation 
to disappointment. High-density scalp EEG data were continuously 
recorded across the game.
Behaviorally, we were interested in evaluating the effects of 
disappointment and elation on cooperation and trust as well as 
the rationality and utility of the different mechanisms that might 
be used to cope with disappointment. Disappointment influences 
DM because individuals try to minimize future negative emotions 
(Taylor, 1991; Quirk and Beer, 2006). However, different behav-
ioral strategies might be implemented by the same or different 
individuals to reduce the emotional impact (Van Dijk et al., 2003) 
of disappointment. Individuals could for example use higher cog-
nitive and costly strategies to maximize their future chances to 
obtain desired outcomes, such as investing extra effort in a task, or 
instead rely on more automatic (and effortless) strategies such as 
lowering their expectations. Since disappointment is proportional 
to the mismatch expectations–actual outcome, reducing expecta-
tions should lower the experienced emotional reaction. Indeed, 
these two ways of acting are predicted by the dual-system theory 
(Evans, 2008) of decision and action that postulates the existence Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  3
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To elicit and quantify disappointment in agreement with Bell’s 
definition, we manipulated the outcomes (the money given back 
by the Trustee) according to the expectations of the Investor (value 
entered as ER). We aimed to elicit different a balanced number 
of trials on each of the following emotional categories in the 
Investor: (1) elation (outcomes much larger than expected, 60 
  trials); (2) disappointment (outcome much lower than expected, 
60 trials); (3) neutral–positive feeling (outcome similar to expec-
tations but slightly higher than expected, 60 trials); (4) neutral–
negative (slightly less than expected, 60 trials). In this definition 
we used cut-off levels set prior to the experiment and described in 
the Appendix section.
Following Bell (1985), we used the disparity, i.e., the differ-
ence between the received outcome and the expected one (ER), 
as our quantitative measure of disappointment/elation for each 
trial. Pictures (faces) of the Trustees were randomly assigned to 
one of the four categories of outcomes, a fact unknown to the 
participants. We indeed expected that participants will blame the 
unknown external Trustees for their misfortune, minimizing the 
self-blame and therefore the influence of regret.
To further control if disappointment was correctly isolated from 
regret we created two variants of the game: the experimental and 
the control conditions. In the experimental condition (EC), played 
by 19 out of the 32 participants, subjects were told that the Trustees 
with whom they were going to play had already participated in a 
similar study so that for each possible value of investment we (the 
experimenters) already knew how much the Trustees were willing 
to give back in return. Thus, the participants thought that they were 
playing with human opponents although not in real-time. In this 
EC condition, outcomes are then completely determined by the 
external factor (the generosity of the Trustee) and no self-blame 
and regret is expected to arise. The remaining subjects (13) played a 
version of the game named Control Condition (CC) in which they 
experiment was approved by the local ethics committee (Geneva 
University Hospitals). A written informed consent was signed by 
all participants before starting the experiment. After signing the 
informed consent, the participants read the instructions.
InducIng and quantIfyIng dIsaPPoIntMent through  
the trust gaMe
In our version of the TG (Figure 1), participants (Investors) had 
to decide how much money out of a 10 Swiss Francs endowment 
at each trial they wanted to share with an unknown opponent 
(Trustee) on the sole basis of a picture of his/her face presented 
for half a second. Trustees were never repeated to avoid associat-
ing a face to a previous experience. The faces presented to the 
subjects were neutral faces selected from the FERET database 
(Phillips et al., 1998, 20001) and were balanced by age, gender, 
and ethnic origins. The experiment was implemented and run 
using Cogent 2000.
At each trial, the Investor had to provide numerical estimates 
of the following variables:
(1)  Trustworthiness (TR): how trustworthy is the Trustee (from 0 
to 10);
(2)  Investment  (INV):  how  much  of  his/her  10  Swiss  Francs 
endowment per trial is to be shared with the Trustee;
(3)  Expected Return (ER) or simply Expectations: how much does 
s/he expect to get back from the Trustee (the share that goes 
from zero to three times the Investment); and
(4)  Confidence (CF): to what extent is s/he certain about current 
decision (from 0 to 10).
FiGurE 1 | Eliciting and quantifying disappointment by the Trust Game. 
Each trial begins with a picture of the Trustee (500 ms). The participant (playing 
the role of Investor) has to rate on 10 points-scale how trustworthy he assesses 
the face to be. Then, the Investor decides how much he is willing to invest in this 
trial (10 points-scale). The amount invested is tripled and given to the Trustee. 
After this exchange, the Investor indicates how much he thinks that the Trustee 
will give him back, on a scale going from 0 to 3 times the investment (expected 
return). Finally, the Investor has to report his self-confidence about all the 
choices he has been making during this trial (10 points-scale). While waiting for 
the outcome (the final share, allegedly dependent on the Trustee’s decision but 
actually set up by the experimenter), a countdown screen flashes three times 
showing the expected return, so that the Investor keeps his expectations in 
mind. The outcome is then revealed, framed in different colors depending on the 
outcome. The Investor plays 240 times, each time against a different Trustee, to 
whom the re-payment is randomly assigned. Varying Trustees from one trial to 
the other increases the chances that Investors blame the unknown external 
Trustees by their misfortune minimizing the self-blame and therefore the 
influence of regret.
1Portions of the research in this paper use the FERET database of facial images col-
lected under the FERET program, sponsored by the DOD Counterdrug Technology 
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before the presentation of the outcome) were extracted after 
notch filtering at 50 Hz and superior harmonics. No baseline 
correction was applied as it might modify the scalp topogra-
phy (Wendel et al., 2009). Averages of the epochs, aligned by 
the onset of the presentation of the outcomes, were computed 
for every subject and outcome. We particularly focused on the 
electrophysiological signals during the period of discovering 
the outcomes as it is the period during which disappointment 
should be experienced and which should correspond to the 
reward/reward omission period where the dopamine cells show 
differential activation.
Seven subjects were excluded from the EEG analysis (but not from 
the behavioral analysis) because of excessive contamination (more 
than half of the 240 trials) of their EEGs by artifacts (electromyo-
graphic contamination, ocular movements). Electrophysiological 
results are then based on a sample of 25 subjects (14 of the EC and 
11 of the CC).
statIstIcal analysIs of behavIoral data
In all analyses the distribution of the data was tested to investigate 
potential deviations of normality assumptions. Non-parametric 
statistics were used when the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test revealed 
deviations from the normal distribution (P > 0.05, Kolmogorov–
Smirnov). To compare multiple groups under normality assump-
tions, we would use analysis of variance (ANOVA/MANOVA). In 
case of deviations we relied on the Kruskal–Wallis analysis of ranks 
which is a non-parametric version of the classical one-way ANOVA, 
and an extension of the Wilcoxon rank sum test to more than two 
groups. Also, when appropriate we graphically depict the data using 
notched boxplots that provide a summary of several important fea-
tures of the distribution of values (e.g., median, confidence interval 
around it, outliers). In these plots, when the notches of two or more 
groups do not overlap then the medians of the two groups differ 
at the 5% significance level.
The significance of the correlation (the P-value) was computed 
in Matlab by transforming the correlation to create a t statistic 
having n − 2 degrees of freedom, where n is the number of vari-
ables. The confidence bounds are based on an asymptotic normal 
distribution of 0.5 × log[(1 + R)/(1 − R)], with an approximate 
variance equal to 1/(n − 3).
statIstIcal analysIs of event-related PotentIals
All analyses for EEG and behavioral data were carried out using 
custom-built Matlab routines.
To avoid any dependence of the results on the reference elec-
trode we mainly relied on the statistical analysis of the whole ERP 
topography, i.e., the instantaneous spatial distribution of potential 
over the scalp surface measured by the 64 recording channels, 
instead of the most conventional single trace analysis. Note that 
the ERP topography (as a landscape) is reference-independent. A 
reference is a constant value added or subtracted to the voltage 
instantaneously recorded at each electrode. As such, a reference 
can modify the absolute value for each map (the individual wave 
shape and components recorded at each electrode) but never the 
topography of the map. This is identical to altitude maps of a 
terrain landscape that remain invariant when referred to the sea 
level or to any other altitude. The relative ranking of the scalp 
were explicitly informed that we programmed the game according 
to predefined rules. In this condition, the subject (Investor) might 
occasionally blame himself for not discovering the rules of the 
game. The development of the game and the images presented 
were identical in both conditions to minimize potential differences 
in EEG patterns. Participants were told that they would be paid 
according to their performance, thus the final goal of the experi-
ment was to maximize their gains.
At the end of the session we asked the participants to fill in a 
questionnaire in which they had to report: (a) the emotion that best 
described what they felt in the cases where they invested substan-
tially but received little in return; (b) if they thought that there was 
a link between their assessment of the faces and the outcomes, or if 
they felt that it was random; (c) if they thought that their ratings 
on the unknown Trustees could have been influenced by previous 
outcomes with different Trustees.
evaluatIng the effects of dIsaPPoIntMent and elatIon uPon 
cooPeratIon and trust
In both variants of the game, Trustees vary from trial to trial. Then, 
trials should be independent (at least in the EC) as there is no 
logical reason to evaluate a new yet unknown Trustee on the basis 
of previous outcome received from a different Trustee. However, 
if disappointment and elation play a role and bias behavior, the 
independency across trials should be abolished and larger changes 
in behavior should be observed immediately after experiencing the 
stronger emotions. In other words, Investors might rate the TR of an 
unknown Trustee lower (higher) after experiencing disappointment 
(elation) and as a consequence invest and expect less.
To assess if participants judged each Trustee independently of 
previous history with other Trustees or if instead previous out-
comes influenced their gaming strategy, we defined a measure of 
the change in strategy (CS) across consecutive trials. The measure 
used was the difference between the value of the previous trial 
(n − 1) and that of the current trial (n) for the three variables under 
study: TR, investment, and expectation. A negative value of the CS 
thus indicates that the Investor has lowered his TR rating/invest-
ment/expectation in the current trial compared to the previous 
one, whereas a positive value means a relative increase in TR rating/
investment/expectation. The plot of the CS (abscissa) vs. previous 
outcome (ordinate) for all trials should show a bell-shaped distribu-
tion (2D-Gaussian) if trials are independent and deviate from the 
bell-shaped distribution when the independency is broken.
eeg recordIngs
The scalp electroencephalogram (EEG, 64 channels) and reac-
tion times (RTs) were recorded during all steps of the game. The 
EEG was recorded at 1024 Hz (fifth order sinc filter with a −3 dB 
point at 1/5th of the sampling frequency) using 64 BioSemi 
sintered Ag–AgCl electrodes. The electrodes were mounted on 
the manufacturer-provided cap according to an extended 10–20 
system. The Biosemi system uses a common mode sense (CMS) 
active electrode as the reference that we transformed to the aver-
age reference during offline analysis. Visual inspection was used 
to reject artifact-contaminated trials. Bad electrodes interpola-
tion was based on spherical splines using Cartool (http://brain-
mapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm). Epochs of 1100 ms (100 ms Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  5
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To  compare  single  trace  ERPs  we  relied  on  a  Friedman 
  non-parametric tests (as data were not normally distributed accord-
ing to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) which compare column 
effects in a two-way layout. Friedman’s test is similar to classical 
balanced two-way ANOVA, but it tests only for column effects after 
adjusting for possible row effects. It does not test for row effects 
or interaction effects. Friedman’s test is appropriate here as we are 
interested in comparing the relative ranking of neural responses to 
the different outcomes irrespective of the individual voltage values 
which are a nuisance effect as they might simply emerge from dif-
ferences in scalp/skull thickness. These potential differences need 
to be taken into account but are not of any interest.
All statistical analysis of ERPs and topographies included a pre-
stimulus window of 100 ms. By including this baseline period in all 
statistical comparisons we make sure that no significant differences 
existed already in the pre-stimulus period and therefore that they 
are due to the processing of the outcomes. Hence, like baseline 
correction, our approach insures that differences are related to the 
outcome but contrarily to baseline correction we achieve this goal 
without distorting the scalp maps.
results
the behavIoral consequence of dIsaPPoIntMent and elatIon 
and Its asyMMetry
The questionnaire confirmed that the experiment was effective in 
eliciting disappointment amongst the participants. When asked to 
evaluate their feelings after adverse unexpected outcomes, the vast 
majority (30/32) of the subjects spontaneously reported negative 
emotions, with disappointment being the prevalent one (12/32). 
Moreover, in a forced-choice version of this question, they restated 
their answer by choosing disappointment (15/32 subjects), over anger 
(7/32), betrayal (6/32), or regret (3/32). A summary of the individual 
responses to the questionnaire is given in Table A1 of Appendix.
If participants playing the CC condition were trying to cogni-
tively decode the implemented game strategy they should neglect 
their personal impressions on the Trustees and invest according to 
rules different from TR. Consequently, the correlations between 
TR ratings and investments should be much lower in the CC than 
in the EC conditions. However, TR ratings and investments were 
highly correlated in both conditions (mean linear correlation coef-
ficient r = 0.65 in EC and 0.61 in CC, corresponding to P-values 
smaller than 10−8 in both cases) and correlations were also highly 
significant between TR ratings and ERs (mean r = 0.72 in EC, 0.69 
in CC, P < 10−9). The highest correlations were however observed 
between investments and ERs (mean r = 0.79 in EC and 0.76 in 
CC)   suggesting that expectations are the most determinant factor 
for decisions within this context. The highly significant correlations 
between trust and investments or trust and ERs in the CC indicate 
that subjects relied on their personal impressions about the Trustees 
in both the EC and CC. This is confirmed by the fact that most 
participants (9/13) in the CC reported in the questionnaire a causal 
link between the face and the outcomes rather than the random 
assignment actually implemented. The total gains, the amount of 
TR ratings, investment, or ER showed no behavioral differences 
(P = 0.3, Kruskal–Wallis) between participants of the EC and CC 
(Figure 2). The comparison of RTs between subjects of EC and CC 
revealed no significant   differences either.
measured voltage values – i.e., the landscape – remains unaffected 
by the reference and therefore the topographies can be compared 
to the ones reported in other studies.
The analysis of ERP topography yields a second advantage over 
single trace ERP analysis which is essential to our goals of assessing 
the dual-system theory. Since electric fields at the scalp bear a linear 
relationship with the underlying generators, differences in scalp 
topographies necessarily reflect differences in underlying genera-
tors. Here, we stick to the term neural generators in the sense used 
in the discrete formulation of the direct and inverse problems of 
the EEG, i.e., the distribution of current density within a discrete 
network of locations within the brain. Note that simple polarity 
inversions or scaling (multiplicative) factors do not imply different 
generators. In other words, if two ERP topographies are significantly 
different in a non-trivial form, the involved neural generators are 
necessarily different. Some simple math can corroborate this asser-
tion. Let’s Φ denote the vector of the potential values recorded at a 
single time instant over all scalp electrodes. According to Maxwell 
equations Φ can be related to the underlying current distribution 
J (the generators) measured at a discrete grid of points distributed 
over the gray matter by the matrix–vector equation Φ = LJ (Grave 
de Peralta Menendez et al., 2000). Here L denotes the lead field 
matrix summarizing the geometrical and conductivity properties 
of the neural media which can be safely assumed constant over the 
time course of the experiment for each subject. Let’s assume that 
two different non-collinear scalp maps Φ1 and Φ2 have been meas-
ured on the same geometry (e.g., subjects). Then, from LJ1 = Φ1 and 
LJ2 = Φ2 follows that L(J1 − J2) = Φ1 − Φ2 ≠ 0. This is only possible 
if J1 ≠ J2. Interestingly, the converse effect does not hold true, i.e., 
it is impossible to conclude that the generators of two identical 
maps are identical as silent sources producing no measurable scalp 
potentials might exist.
In summary, two different scalp topographies necessarily imply 
two different distributions of underlying neural generators. The 
veracity of this assertion derives from the linear relationship exist-
ing between distributions of currents within the brain (neural gen-
erators) and scalp measured potentials (EEG) described by the lead 
field operator which can be “safely” assumed invariant over the 
course of the experiment.
Note that to exclude possible confounds due to trivial changes 
in scale (e.g., polarity) between the generators we have to be careful 
selecting the appropriate measure of closeness or resemblance. A 
good measure of the similarity or dissimilarity of the topography 
of instantaneous scalp maps, insensitive to simple polarity inver-
sions, or scaling factors, is the absolute value of the correlation 
coefficient between maps.
We used the correlation coefficient as the test statistics to build 
a non-parametric multivariate randomization test to evaluate the 
statistical significance of differences between instantaneous scalp 
maps within two or more groups. This test, known as a randomized 
one-way MANOVA (Mielke and Berry, 2001), can be applied to 
each measured topography, i.e., to each time frame. In the test, 
we assume that no differences exist between the compared groups 
(hypothesis Ho) and compute the distribution of the test statistic 
by permuting members from one group to the other 1500 times. 
Note that the test is applied to each time frame preserving the mil-
lisecond order temporal resolution of the original data.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  6
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  experimental manipulation failed to evoke a more cognitive strategy 
in CC   participants that would have reflected the cognitive impact 
of regret. We therefore decided to pull together participants from 
both conditions into a single group to summarize results.
Figure 3 depicts the plot of the CS vs. previous disappointment 
for the three variables under study: TR, investments (INV), and ERs 
when all participants are pooled together. The plot clearly reveals 
a marked asymmetry in the distribution of values for the ER with 
respect to the x-axis (previous outcome). While for elation (positive 
x-axis) the distribution is approximately bell-shaped, a sort of linear 
trend appears for negative values in the x-axis that correspond to 
disappointment. In other words, stronger disappointment is fol-
lowed by largest decreases in expectations about new Trustees which 
contradict the hypothesis of independent trials.
It is precisely the asymmetry between disappointment and 
elation which rules out that this behavior reflects an increase in 
  cautiousness due to having invested a large amount in the previ-
ous trial (and would be consequently unrelated to the outcome 
of this trial). Indeed, to obtain an outcome much larger than 
expected   subjects must also invest large amounts, so this effect 
of cautiousness might be observed too. However, the decrease in 
expectations is not observed for elation. In addition the converse 
effect is more often observed: some subjects tend to increase 
their expectations after a strong positive outcome. The modi-
fication in behavior revealed by Figure 3 is therefore a conse-
quence of disappointment and reveals an important asymmetry 
in the behavioral consequences of a positive and a negative RPE. 
Disappointment bears a larger behavioral impact than elation 
in this context.
Inter-IndIvIdual dIfferences In coPIng wIth dIsaPPoIntMent: 
causes and consequences
Interestingly, inter-individual differences emerged as a new unan-
ticipated factor in this experimental design. Indeed, the largest 
behavioral differences amongst Investors were observed across 
the individuals rather than across the EC and CC  as revealed 
by their individual plots of CS. We therefore classified the sub-
jects according to their behavior following disappointment. For 
that, we defined a measure aimed to reflect the individual impact 
of previous outcome on expectancy ratings that we termed the 
Disappointment Tolerance Threshold (DTT). With this measure 
(Figure 3, rightmost lower inset) we tried to characterize the extent 
to which each subject deviates from the distribution expected when 
trials are independent. We defined the DTT for each participant 
as the x-value at which the last positive change in ER is observed 
(y-axis) divided by the maximum of disappointment experienced2. 
Dividing by the maximum of disappointment allowed us to cre-
ate a measure between 0 and 1 that facilitated the ranking of the 
subjects. Note that the DTT is defined for the ER for the sake of 
compatibility with the formal definition of disappointment (Bell, 
1985) and because it is the variable that better correlated with 
the investments.
The individual plots of the CS for the variable ER (expecta-
tions) as a function of the disappointment experienced in the 
previous trial reveals a strong bias in the behavior of the sub-
jects in both the EC (Figure A1 of Appendix) and CC conditions 
(Figure A2 of Appendix). Indeed, beyond an individual-specific 
level of disappointment, only negative CS values of ER (dashed 
green zone) are observed for all Investors, irrespective of the con-
dition. The absence of positive CS values beyond specific levels of 
disappointment in previous trials constitutes a systematic devia-
tion from the expected bell-shaped distribution which indicates 
that trials are not independent from previous history. This ten-
dency was somehow present for investments and to a lesser extent 
for TR ratings (not shown at the individual levels) suggesting 
that expectations is the factor the most affected by emotions in 
our experimental framework. Note that at intermediate levels of 
disappointment/elation (neutral outcomes) the distribution of 
choices appears equally distributed around the vertical axis as 
expected for independent trials.
The individual plots of CS as a function of prior disappointment 
failed to reveal any particular difference between the EC and CC 
participants. In both groups, participants invested and expected 
according to the TR ratings they accorded to the unknown Trustees 
and participants from both groups appeared to be equally sensitive 
to previous disappointment. Indeed, it seems like if there is always 
a limit to the tolerance of disappointment beyond which previ-
ous history modifies subsequent behavior and Trustees are not 
anymore independently assessed. However, while some Investors 
showed this behavior after a small amount of disappointment, 
others seemed less influenced by it. Moreover, the Investors who 
reacted easily to disappointment often increased their expecta-
tions and investments after experiencing elation (Figures A3 and 
A4 of Appendix).
In summary, we found no statistical evidences for significant 
differences between the EC and CC conditions in terms of RTs, 
total gains, and total investments. Answers to the questionnaire 
were similar in both conditions in terms of the relative frequency 
of emotions reported under free and forced choices and no par-
ticular trend differentiating both groups emerged from the plots 
of CS vs. previous disappointment. Therefore, it seems that the 
FiGurE 2 | No behavioral differences emerge in this setting when playing 
with a computer (CC) or a human opponent (EC). Notched boxplots 
showing the distributions of values for total investment, total expectations, 
total gains, and mean reaction times (RTs) for trustworthiness ratings when 
subjects are grouped according to the experimental (EC) or control (CC) 
conditions. No differences in medians in any of the variables are found 
between subjects playing EC or CC at the 5% significance level (P = 0.05) as 
the notches of the two groups overlap. RTs in this and following figures are 
expressed in milliseconds. Gains, investments, or trustworthiness ratings are 
expressed in mean absolute values accumulated over the whole game.
2In addition, and to validate this classification, we used a more complex measure 
based upon estimating, for each participant, the probability of observing only ne-
gative changes in ER for disappointment values in the lower quartile. This measure 
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  decision for the gains of the investor as failing to maximize one’s 
gains is considered an evidence of counter-productive behavior. 
Figure 4B shows that Low-DTT subjects are significantly faster to 
evaluate TR after experiencing disappointment than after neutral 
or favorable outcomes. Moreover, they are also significantly faster 
than the High-DTT group (P = 2 × 10−5, Kruskal–Wallis, indicated 
by an asterisk on top of the bar). They take approximately half 
of the time to evaluate next Trustee after emotional outcomes 
(average: 2014 ms after neutral and 1296 ms after disappointing 
outcomes). This is an important evidence of impulsive behavior 
since they are generally slower than High-DTT to assess the TR 
of the faces when all trials are considered together (Figure 4C, 
last boxplots). It is the reaction to disappointment – and ela-
tion to a lesser extent – that leads to shorter RTs in the Low-
DTT group, rather than a general trend to take faster decisions. 
Importantly, the RTs of High-DTT group in the trials where they 
lowered their expectations after disappointment are not shorter 
than their average RTs. Consequently, while we cannot make a 
judgment on the legitimacy of their decisions, there is no clear 
indication that they were acting upon impulses when confronted 
to adverse outcomes.
To asses the second aspect, i.e., counter-productiveness, we com-
pared the total investment, total expectation, and total gains for the 
Low, Middle, and High-DTT groups (Figure 4C). The total gains 
are significantly different between the three groups (P = 0.0003, 
Kruskal–Wallis), with the largest gains observed for the group with 
Three groups of subjects were created. The first category (low-
DTT) includes participants with the 10 lowest thresholds who 
require little disappointment to modify their behavior. The High-
DTT category consists of participants with the 10 highest DTTs. 
Finally, the remaining five participants constitute the middle cat-
egory. This division is somehow arbitrary as the plot of the DTT 
over subjects (Figure 4A) revealed no clear-cut division. Still, we 
needed large extreme groups as to allow for robust statistical com-
parison of EEG3.
The decrease in expectations in trials following disappoint-
ment observed in the Investors can be either a consequence of 
cognitive updating of the estimates (i.e., after a negative out-
come, the subject thinks that he granted trust too easily in the 
previous trial, so he diminishes it in the following) or simply an 
impulsive (automatic) reaction. To clarify this issue, we analyzed 
two factors considered to be key elements of impulsive decisions 
(Evenden, 1999): (1) the RTs, that are proportional to the cogni-
tive load involved in the decision and (2) the consequences of the 
FiGurE 3 | The influence of disappointment on upcoming decisions. 
Difference of trial n − 1 and trial n (y-axis) as a function of previous 
disappointment (x-axis) for one individual subject (bottom, right), and for the 
three variables Trustworthiness Ratings (TR), Investment (INV), and Expected 
Return (ER) for all subjects. Colors of the scale are proportional to the density of 
observations for the x, y point. Note that the distribution of values considerably 
deviate from the bell-shaped distribution for the largest values of 
disappointment (most negative values in the abscissa) to be expected if each 
new Trustee were assessed independently of previous outcome with a 
completely different Trustee. Disappointment Tolerance Threshold (DTT, the 
rightmost lower inset) is defined for each participant as the x-value at which the 
last positive change in ER is observed (y-axis) divided by the maximum 
disappointment experienced. For example here, the DTT of the individual 
subject is: −10/−22 = 0.45 or 45%.
3We also tried to cluster (matlab “clusterdata” function using correlation as the 
distance) the subjects into three groups based on the EEG topography dominant 
during the interval where EEG differences were maximal (see inter-individual diffe-
rences in coping with disappointment: causes and consequences). Except for some 
movement of subjects (three subjects) from one of the extreme (low and high) to 
the middle category, the grouping of the subject according to their electrophysio-
logical signatures coincided very well with their grouping in behavioral terms as 
defined by the DTT.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  8
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omized MANOVA failed to reveal any differences in scalp topog-
raphies at the 5% significance in the whole second following the 
presentation of the outcomes. Indeed, the distribution of P-values 
over time computed using the randomized MANOVA described 
in Section “Statistical Analysis of Event-Related Potentials” never 
reached values smaller than 0.05 when the EC and CC topographies 
were compared which agrees with the lack of significant different 
observed at the behavioral level. We have no statistical evidences to 
reject the null hypothesis that maps, and therefore the underlying 
generators, are identical.
We therefore explored potential differences in underlying neural 
generators between Low and High-DTT subjects where behavior 
(e.g., RTs, expectations) and results (gains) did clearly differ. These 
behavioral differences might however stem from two different neural 
origins, namely: (1) the impulsive behavior of Low-DTT individu-
als stems from the involvement of structures linked to emotional 
processing that add to the neural structures involved in the automatic 
assessment of outcomes independent of their valence, or (2) The 
impulsive behavior is the rule for both Low and High-DTT individuals 
when confronted to disappointment but High-DTT individuals make 
appeal to cognitive control mechanisms that moderate their impulsive 
reactions leading to slightly slower responses but higher gains.
The statistical comparison of the scalp map topographies between 
the different outcomes (disappointment, elation, and neutral) might 
help to dissociate between both hypotheses. Indeed, if the behavior 
of Low-DTT individuals is a consequence of their strong emotional 
involvement, then a change in topography should appear in the 
cases where they experience emotions (disappointment/elation) 
as compared to neutral outcomes that evoke no emotions. On the 
other hand, if similar neural generators are automatically involved 
in the assessment of all outcomes for both groups but the better 
performance of High-DTT individuals is due to cognitive control, 
then specific maps should appear in High-DTT individuals when 
confronted to disappointment and/or elation but the maps of High-
DTT individuals should be similar to those of Low-DTT for neutral 
outcomes when cognitive control of impulses is not required.
During the assessment of the outcomes we found differences 
in the amplitudes of ERPs and in the scalp topographies within 
(depending on the emotional valence of the outcome) and across 
groups (High and Low-DTT), as detailed below.
Differences in the amplitude of ERP traces across individuals
We observed differences between groups (P < 0.01, Friedman’s non-
parametric two-way ANOVA) in the amplitude and latency of the 
mean ERPs around 350 ms, on several fronto-central electrodes 
(Fp1, F1, F3, FC1, Fpz, AF8, AF4, AFz, Fz, F2, F4, FC4, FC2, FCz, 
Cz) as illustrated in Figure 5A for FCz.
Differences in scalp topographies between individuals
Significant differences (P < 0.01, randomized MANOVA) in scalp 
topographies were observed between the Low and the High-DTT 
groups for the interval between 320 and 420 ms after strongly 
disappointing outcomes (Figures 5B,C). Neutral outcomes did 
not lead to any differences in topography (Figures A5 and A6 
of Appendix). A very brief topographic difference (380–400 ms) 
was observed between groups for the case of elation (Figure A7 
of Appendix). No significant differences in topographies were 
the High-DTT, intermediate gains for the Middle-DTT group, and 
the lowest gains for the Low-DTT group. The comparison of the 
total investment between the three groups showed no significant 
differences (P = 0.19, Kruskal–Wallis) indicating that the smaller 
gains of the Low-DTT cannot be explained by an overall more 
cautious strategy of investment but again, by a sudden decrease in 
expectations after disappointment.
electroPhysIologIcal results
A  likely  explanation  for  the  behavioral  differences  observed 
amongst individuals is the engagement of different brain structures 
(neural generators) to cope with emotionally laden outcomes. As 
discussed in the Section “Materials and Methods,” formal evidence 
for the engagement of different neural generators can be obtained 
by statistically comparing the whole head topography of the scalp 
recorded ERPs, i.e., the spatial distribution of the potential values 
or simply the maps.
If regret, instead of disappointment, arises in the EC condition 
and since both emotions are found to stem from different neural 
substrates, then we should expect differences in scalp topographies 
between Investors playing the EC and CC. This difference should 
appear when subjects are confronted to the outcomes as it is the 
period where the emotions are experienced. However, the rand-
FiGurE 4 | impact of disappointment sensitivity on behavior. 
(A) Segregation of the subjects on the basis of behavior. Disappointment 
Tolerance Thresholds are shown on y-axis. (B) Mean (over subjects) reaction 
times after standardization by individual mean reaction times over the whole 
task. The disappointment in previous trial was individually normalized and 
divided into 10 bins of equal length. (C) Boxplots showing the distributions of 
values for total investment, total expectations, total gains, and mean reaction 
times (RTs) for trustworthiness ratings when subjects are grouped by DTT 
values. Subjects who reduce their expectations after disappointment take 
faster decisions but expect less and gain less while investing the same as 
subjects who are less sensitive to disappointment.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  9
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FiGurE 5 | Electrophysiological differences between individuals with High 
and Low Tolerance to Disappointment when confronted to disappointing 
outcomes (time 0). (A) Signals recorded at a fronto-central electrode (FCz) after 
presentation of the disappointing outcomes. (B) Evolution through time of the 
corresponding Event-Related Potential maps (C) P-value for a randomized MANOVA 
performed on the maps. Threshold for significance (P < 0.05) is indicated by the red 
line. Note that the maps (ERP topography) significantly differ between groups in the 
interval 320–420 ms indicating that the underlying generators are necessarily 
different. Consequently, High and Low-DTT individuals differ in the neural 
generators used to cope with disappointing outcomes in the specified interval.
observed during the initial interval that contains the ERP compo-
nents P100 and N170, supposed to index basic visual processing, 
or after 400 ms.
Differences in scalp topographies as a function of the emotional 
valence of the outcome
The within-group analysis of topography comparing the different 
outcomes  (elation;  disappointment;  neutral–positive/negative) 
for the High and Low-DTT groups separately revealed significant 
differences between the outcomes for the interval 320–420 ms 
within the High-DTT group. No significant differences were found 
between the different outcomes for Low-DTT individuals. The post 
hoc analysis (based on paired comparisons using the same test) 
identified the disappointment condition as the source of the differ-
ences (Figure 6) between the outcomes for the High-DTT group.
The existence of significant differences in topography proves that 
Low and High-DTT individuals relied on different (although maybe 
partially overlapping) brain areas (neural generators) to evaluate 
disappointing outcomes. Consistent with our second hypothesis, 
the different ERP landscape appears within the High-DTT group 
(Figure 6). Indeed, when comparing the maps of High-DTTs follow-
ing the other outcomes (positive and neutral ones), they are statisti-
cally indistinguishable from all the maps of the Low-DTT group.
dIscussIon
dIsaPPoIntMent as a bIasIng factor In socIal decIsIon MakIng
Using a variant of the TG, we investigated the behavioral and neu-
ral mechanisms employed by humans to cope with disappoint-
ment and elation, i.e., the emotions experienced in the presence 
of negative and positive RPEs (Bell, 1985). The advantages of this 
experimental design are: (1) it allows inducing disappointment in 
isolation from regret and (2) it allows the manipulation and quan-
titative evaluation on a trial-by-trial basis of disappointment using 
Bell’s original definition which formally coincides with the size of a 
negative RPE. The absence of statistically significant differences in 
the measured behavioral parameters or EEG topographies between 
the two ECs created, i.e., playing against a human Trustee (EC) or 
against the computer (CC) suggests that regret was not evoked in 
the experimental paradigm. A likely explanation for this finding, 
that apparently contradicts previous studies reporting differences 
in gambling tasks when playing against humans and machines 
(Sally, 1995; McCabe et al., 2001) is the display of a Trustee’s face 
in both variants of the game. Indeed, previous studies have shown 
that the mere presence of a picture depicting a face is sufficient to 
modify human behavior (Bateson et al., 2006). The results of the 
questionnaire showed that CC players imagined links between the 
type of face and the outcome, and unexpectedly invested according 
to their TR ratings. These elements suggest that CC participants 
played as EC participants because the CC still involved a very strong 
social component which permits the attribution of misfortune to 
others minimizing self-blame and regret. Taken together all these 
aspects allow concluding that this design was successful in its goal 
of isolating one of the specific emotions involved in DM to explore 
its impact on behavior and its electrophysiological correlates.
In behavioral terms, the most consistent and novel results of 
this study are: (1) A negative RPE (disappointment) leads to a 
systematic reduction of expectations about the reciprocity of yet 
unknown Trustees that was observed over all participants, (2) There Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  10
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Inter-IndIvIdual dIfferences In the tolerance to 
dIsaPPoIntMent
Beyond this general decrease in expectations following breaches in 
trust, we found large inter-individual differences in the tolerance 
to disappointment. Our results consequently support Bell’s (1985) 
assumptions: individuals more sensitive to disappointment adopt a 
more pessimistic view about the future. Indeed, within our sample, 
the group of Investors with lower DTTs invested less and expected less 
after being highly disappointed, which led them to earn significantly 
less money than the High-DTT group. In other words, their pessimistic 
views on future unknown Trustees induced by prior experience made 
them less effective in achieving their goals of maximizing gains. These 
elements combined with the shorter RTs (often considered as a core 
aspect of impulsivity, Whiteside and Lynam, 2001) favor an explanation 
in terms of impulsivity rather than being the reflection of the cognitive 
reassessment of the subject’s trust estimates [as for instance could be the 
case in other studies; Delgado et al., 2005]. This behavior was probably 
not fully conscious as not all participants reported a possible influence 
of outcomes in prior trials while most of them acknowledged that they 
might have adapted their choices as a function of personal feelings 
about categories of trustees (e.g., “Old people never betray”).
a dual systeM account for bIased decIsIons
The dual-system theory (Evans, 2008) provides a plausible explana-
tion to the maladaptive behavior of the Low-DTT group against 
the (mostly) well-adapted choices of the High-DTT group. Subjects 
is a clear asymmetry in the behavioral consequences of a negative 
(disappointment) and a positive (elation) RPE. Behavioral changes 
after elation are not systematic across participants as some of them 
showed no systematic deviation of the circular uniform distribution 
after elation while others showed a trend to increase (or decrease) 
expectations. We can argue about whether it is rational or fair to 
decrease expectations about a completely unknown person due to 
the behavior of others. However, in our experimental context, this 
rather universal tendency is clearly counter-productive as demon-
strated by the smaller gains of Low-DTT participants.
Interestingly, while most studies in the literature have thus far 
focused on trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Baumgartner et al., 
2008), we observe here that expectation was a more sensitive variable 
to reflect the behavioral modifications following   disappointment. 
Indeed, in a similar experimental setup, some researchers (van’t 
Wout and Sanfey, 2008) already reported an inexplicable decrease 
of trust toward an unknown partner because of the previous trial’s 
outcome. However, this influence was minor compared to the influ-
ence of the TR of the face, as rated by independent participants. 
van’t Wout and Sanfey (2008) found no significant interaction 
between TR of the face and previous outcome, suggesting that the 
TR rating was clearly more decisive for the investment decision 
than previous trial’s outcome. Unfortunately the authors did not 
quantify the expectation that is – according to our study – much 
more decisive for DM than trust as suggested by its decisive role 
in RPE and learning.
FiGurE 6 | Different neural generators are involved in the evaluation of 
outcomes for High-DTT players. (A) Representative scalp maps averaged over 
Low (top row) and High (lower row) DTT subjects when confronted to outcomes of 
difference valence (columns). Maps are selected from the period where significant 
differences in topographies were observed across groups and categories for the 
High-DTT individuals. The map with fronto-central maximum (top row, left most 
map) appears only when High-DTT participants are confronted by disappointment. 
A different map is observed after neutral and satisfactory outcomes for the 
High-DTT which is not significantly different from the map seen for all outcomes in 
the Low-DTT group. (B) Randomized MANOVA reveals that the fronto-central map 
is significantly different (P < 0.05, in red) from the three other maps of the High-DTT 
group, whereas no significant differences are observed across outcomes in the 
Low-DTT group (right). The fact that the difference in scalp topographies appears for 
the High-DTT group confronted to disappointing outcomes suggest that cognitive 
control over the automatic impulsive reaction is the source of their better 
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caused by higher local information processing or higher afferent 
information within a voxel. Consequently, differences in scalp maps 
can be explained by either dynamic changes in: (a) the spatial con-
figuration of the areas (voxels) activated by each task or alterna-
tively, (b) synchronous (sufficient to be detectable at the scalp) 
input to some elements of the network and not to others that will 
necessarily lead to the activation or the inhibition (depending on 
input being excitatory or inhibitory) of these elements.
Consequently, from scalp map differences we can safely infer 
differences in the underlying distribution of generators from 
which we can infer that the neural structures activated by the 
compared conditions differ. The co-existence of different neural 
generators within identical individuals (the High-DTT group) 
rules out per se that anatomical differences are at the basis of 
electrophysiological differences. Similarly the electrophysiologi-
cal analysis was designed to exclude differences due to trivial 
changes in generators such as inversion of the dipolar moment 
(leading to polarity inversions in the maps). Consequently the 
significant differences detected between the scalp topographies of 
Low and High-DTT participants or within the High-DTT group 
necessarily reflect differences in the brain areas implicated in the 
processing of the outcomes.
For neutral outcomes, we found no evidences for changes in 
neural generators (statistically identical maps across and within 
groups for neutral outcomes). Behaviorally, the distribution of 
expectations as a function of previous disappointment does not 
deviate from the uniform distribution for neutral outcomes and 
RTs were not different across the Low and High-DTT groups. 
Under neutral outcomes that coincide with subjects expectations 
no RPE should emerge and there is to need to use cognitive con-
trol to inhibit automatic responses. The automatic system might 
help to take fast decisions and to keep going on as long as the real 
outcomes are close to the expectations (neutral cases) but lead to 
avoidance (sometimes approach) reactions when the outcomes are 
worse (better) than expected as observed in Low-DTT subjects. 
Indeed, Low-DTT individuals tended to increase their expectations 
after experiencing elation in the previous trial. The short (20 ms) 
difference exclusive to High-DTT participants during elation fur-
ther supports this interpretation. In contrast, the High-DTT group, 
who modify the neural generators, might have used the reflective 
system when confronted to unexpected outcomes, which helped 
them to adapt their behavior and avoid prejudiced social decisions. 
Thus, the particular role of the reflective system in this context 
seems to be to withhold the reflexive behavior by inhibiting the 
impulsive reaction to systematically decrease expectations about 
an unknown Trustee.
Importantly, if the results of this study were to support an emo-
tional vs. rational explanation we should have found differences 
when comparing emotional to neutral outcomes in the group show-
ing the bias (the Low-DTTs). However Low-DTT map topographies 
showed no differences as a function of previous trial’s outcome. 
The more plausible explanation of the fact that their high sensitiv-
ity to disappointment (strongly impacting their behavior) is not 
reflected in their maps is that the same generators (neural network) 
is responsible for all the aspects of their behavior. In this context 
the theory of an automatic system as described earlier fits well the 
data whereas there is little support for an interpretation in terms 
in the High-DTT group earned more money but were slower than 
Low-DTT participants after disappointing outcomes suggesting 
the involvement of a more reflective but slower processing evoked 
by  negative  RPE.  The  electrophysiological  results  additionally 
support this view. First, the ERP appearing around 350 ms after 
the presentation of the outcome can be related to the family of 
feedback-related potentials (Falkenstein et al., 2000). It is present in 
both groups of subjects, reflecting the fact that they both discover 
a negative feedback. There is however a difference in the ampli-
tude, the one of Low-DTT group being smaller. Interestingly, it 
has been shown recently that one of those feedback-related signals, 
the Outcome-Related-Positivity, is smaller and appears earlier in 
impulsive subjects (Kamarajan et al., 2009). This electrophysiologi-
cal cue adds value to the interpretation of an impulsive behavior 
in the Low-DTT.
There is to our knowledge only one EEG study on the Ultimatum 
Game (Polezzi et al., 2008). The authors observed an FRN and con-
cluded that it distinguishes between fair and other kinds of offers 
(mid-values  and  unfair).  First,  Polezzi  et  al.  (2008)  placed  the 
emphasis on the analysis of FRN related to the evaluation of the 
offers rather than the assessment of the outcomes as we did. Second, 
their definition of FRN might not be compatible with the one used in 
other studies. Indeed, the lack of regularity in the definition of FRN 
makes difficult the interpretation of our ERP findings on the light 
of the feedback-related potentials literature. Contrarily to the well 
standardized sensory ERP responses, feedback-related ERP studies 
are hardly comparable as the definition of the components – as well 
as the parameters used to process the electrical data (e.g., reference 
electrode, subtract error from correct, etc) – is extremely variable. 
Moreover, it has been shown that cognitive strategies can regulate 
both physiological (skin conductance) and neural (striatum) signals 
(Delgado et al., 2008), which complicates again a clear comparison of 
the results yielded by different paradigms. Recently it has been sug-
gested to denote Outcome-Related Potentials (Negativity/Positivity) 
all the signals that are linked to outcomes (Kamarajan et al., 2009). 
This terminology presents the advantage to encompass both the 
quality (gain/loss) and the quantity (small/large) dimensions. This 
is a first step, but maybe there should first be a consensus on the 
definition itself of those components, or the reference electrode 
used to show the data. Nevertheless, the asymmetry observed for 
disappointment and elation does however support the idea that 
neural mechanisms of feedback processing differ between gains and 
losses (Cohen et al., 2007).
The topographical analysis of EEG data revealed that at least 
two different configurations of neural generators were active in the 
High-DTT group during the evaluation of the outcome. Neither 
before nor after this window have we observed significant differ-
ences between conditions. Moreover, the map of the High-DTT 
group measured during disappointment at the interval of the dif-
ferences did not appear later in the neutral conditions. The existence 
of differences in the distribution of generators implies that at least 
in one (more likely in a discrete set of brain voxels as enough syn-
chronized activity is required to produce a measurable scalp EEG) 
the current density is larger in one condition than in the other.
In physical terms, the current density is a measure of the density 
of flow of a conserved charge given, in the case of neural tissue, 
by the flow of charged ions. Increases in current density are either Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  12
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social domain activate striatal regions that are normally implicated 
in prediction error and valuation during appetitive and aversive 
conditioning (Harris and Fiske, 2010). Curiously, in the study from 
Harris and Fiske consistent expectations during this experiment 
activated areas involved in social cognition. The inter-individual 
differences we have reported here in the susceptibility of previous 
experience on future decisions might be therefore due to the dif-
ferential involvement of prefrontal and striatal circuits in reaction 
to prediction errors. These differences might be genetically deter-
mined or a consequence of social learning but further studies are 
needed to understand the complex interactions existing between 
personality traits, social learning, and neural circuits underlying 
reward, learning, and prediction errors.
Whereas some previous studies investigated emotions such as 
regret and disappointment (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 
2007) in the context of DM, or related topics such as unfair revenge 
(Herrmann et al., 2008), no study has, to our knowledge, formally 
quantified disappointment (as defined by Bell) and manipulated it 
in a dynamic context to explore its neural correlates and behavioral 
consequences.
The merit and original contribution from this study stems 
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as between different individuals (De Martino et al., 2006). Our 
results help to clarify circumstances under which each configura-
tion of generators emerge, the consequences of relying upon one 
or another system and also the incidence of personality traits in 
deciding which system gains the upper hand.
of   emotional vs. rational dual system. It must be however acknowl-
edged that this issue is not completely solved as it is based on accept-
ing the null hypothesis for no topographical differences.
Scalp potential of High-DTT subjects in the case of extremely 
disappointing outcomes resembles the map linked to error or con-
flict detection elucidated in other studies (Holroyd et al., 2003, 
2006; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007). This map has been localized to 
medial structures in the frontal wall (Carter and van Veen, 2007), 
in particular to the ACC. Interestingly, the ACC seems to have a 
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aPPendIx
Methods
The following cut-off levels were used to determine the four cat-
egories of outcome as a function of the expected return (ER) and 
the Investment (INV):
(1)  Neutral–negative: if ER > INV, interval = [ER − (0.4 × INV); 
ER], or interval = [ER; (ER × 0.4)]);
(2)  Neutral–positive: if ER > INV, interval = [ER; ER + (0.4 × INV)], 
or [ER; ER + (0.4 × ER)]);
Table A1 | Summary of subjects and individual responses to the questionnaire.
Subject  Age  Gender  Laterality  Condition  Link  Change in  Emotion  Forced choice  DTT 
          judgment-face  strategy
  1  26  M  Left  CONTR  Yes (CA)  Yes, voluntarily  Disappointment  Disappointment 
  2  27  M  Right  CONTR  Yes (CA)  Yes, voluntarily  Disappointment  Disappointment  LOW
  3  26  M  Right  CONTR  Yes  Yes, voluntarily  Disappointment  Disappointment 
  4  20  F  Right  CONTR  No  Yes, voluntarily  Disappointment  Disappointment  HIGH
  5  24  F  Right  CONTR  Yes  Yes, voluntarily  Frustration  Disappointment  HIGH
  6  24  M  Left  CONTR  No  Yes, voluntarily  Frustration  Disappointment 
  7  21  F  Right  CONTR  Yes  Yes, voluntarily  Frustration  Regret 
  8  20  F  Right  CONTR  No  Yes, voluntarily  Frustration  Anger 
  9  22  F  Right  CONTR  Yes  Yes, voluntarily  Frustration  Betrayal  HIGH
10  19  M  Left  CONTR  Yes (CA)  Yes, voluntarily  Irritation  Anger  LOW
11  20  F  Right  CONTR  Yes (CA)  Yes, voluntarily  Irritation  Anger 
12  19  M  Right  CONTR  Maybe  Yes, voluntarily  Amusement  Disappointment  HIGH
13  26  M  Right  CONTR  No  Yes, voluntarily  Laughter  Betrayal  LOW
14  26  F  Right  EXP  More or less  Yes (CA + PO)  Disappointment  Disappointment  HIGH
15  30  M  Right  EXP  Yes  No  Disappointment  Disappointment  HIGH
16  33  M  Right  EXP  Yes (CA)  Yes (CA + PO)  Disappointment  Disappointment  HIGH
17  24  F  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes, depending  Disappointment  Disappointment  HIGH 
            on the results
18  30  M  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes  Disappointment  Disappointment  LOW
19  25  F  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes (CA)  Disappointment  Disappointment  LOW
20  27  F  Right  EXP  Yes    Disappointment  Disappointment  LOW
21  26  M  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes, involuntarily  Disappointment  Disgust  LOW
22  31  M  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes (CA)  Despair  Regret  HIGH
23  27  M  Right  EXP  Yes  No  Frustration  Anger  HIGH
24  25  F  Left  EXP  Yes  Yes, beyond  Frustration  Betrayal   
            control, PO
25  24  F  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes, voluntarily  Frustration  Disappointment   
            even if irrational
26  32  F  Right  EXP  No    Anger  Anger  LOW
27  30  F  Right  EXP  No    Anger  Betrayal 
28  27  F  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes (PO)  Irritation  Anger 
29  23  F  Right  EXP  Yes  Not really,   Betrayal  Betrayal  LOW 
            sometimes PO
30  27  M  Right  EXP  Yes  Yes, voluntarily  Negative  Anger  LOW
31  25  F  Right  EXP  Yes (CA)  Maybe  Astonishment  Regret 
32  20  F  Right  EXP  Maybe  Yes (PO)  Disillusion  Betrayal 
(3)  Disappointment: outcome much lower than expected; inter-
val = [0; smallest value (even INV or ER)/2];
(4)  Elation: outcome much higher than expected; if ER > INV: 
interval = [ER + (possible maximum − ER)/2; maximum pos-
sible] or interval = [2 × INV; 2.5 × INV]).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  15
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FiGurE A1 | DTT for each participant playing the Experimental Condition. The dashed green zone represents the absence of positive change in expectations in 
actual trial compared to previous trial, and is present for all 19 subjects of the experimental condition (EC).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  16
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Figure A2 | DTT for single subjects in the Control Condition. The dashed green zone represents the absence of positive change in expectations in actual trial 
compared to previous trial, and is present for all 11 subjects of the control condition (CC).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  17
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FiGurE A3 | Changes in Strategy as a function of previous disappointment for Low-DTT group. Change in the three variables under study as a function of the 
disappointment experienced in previous trial. TR stands for Trustworthiness Ratings, INV for the investment, and ER for the expected return (expectations). A 
tendency to raise the TR and ER after elation (great positive value on x-axis) is observed.
FiGurE A4 | Changes in Strategy as a function of previous disappointment. Change in the three variables under study as a function of the disappointment 
experienced in previous trial. TR stands for Trustworthiness Ratings, INV for the investment, and ER for the expected return (expectations). Here there is no tendency 
to increase any of the variables after elation. This demonstrates a weaker influence of previous history for this group.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  18
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FiGurE A5 | Electrophysiological comparison between High and Low-DTT groups under neutral–negative outcomes. (A) Signals recorded at a fronto-central 
electrode (FCz) after presentation of the neutral–negative outcomes at time 0. (B) Evolution through time of the corresponding Event-Related Potential maps (C) P-value 
for a randomized MANOVA performed on the maps. Threshold for significant differences (P < 0.05) is indicated by the red line. No significant differences are observed.
FiGurE A6 | Electrophysiological comparison between High and Low-DTT groups under neutral–positive outcomes. (A) Signals recorded at a fronto-central 
electrode (FCz) after presentation of the neutral–positive outcomes at time 0. (B) Evolution through time of the corresponding Event-Related Potential maps (C) P-value 
for a randomized MANOVA performed on the maps. Threshold for significant differences (P < 0.05) is indicated by the red line. No differences are observed.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 4  | Article 235  |  19
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FiGurE A7 | Electrophysiological comparison between High and Low-DTT groups under elation. (A) Signals recorded at a fronto-central electrode (FCz) after 
presentation of the Positive (Elation) outcomes at time 0. (B) Evolution through time of the corresponding Event-Related Potential maps (C) P-value for a randomized 
MANOVA performed on the maps. Threshold for significant differences (P < 0.05) is indicated by the red line. A significant difference is observed during 20 ms (380–400 ms).